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THE MODERN STATE AS AN OCCASION OF SIN:
A PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS OF THE WELFARE
STATE
JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE*
Let me begin by delineating the boundaries of what I intend
to discuss in this provocatively titled article. I shall assume, with
Aristotle and Aquinas, that the state is a natural and necessary
institution, one that is not evil in itself. I realize that this proposi-
tion is debatable, but I shall take it as given for the present
discussion.
Still, things that are not evil in themselves may nonetheless
lead us into evil so frequently, and so consistently, that we have a
positive moral duty to avoid them. This is what is meant by the
Catholic concept of an occasion of sin: something not evil in
itself, but which leads a person into sin so often that the person is
morally required to avoid it. I shall argue that there are some
activities of the modern state that can properly be called occa-
sions of sin in this sense.
Specifically, I shall focus on the redistributive activities of
the modern, democratic state. I will speak mainly about the
activity usually called the welfare state, that is, redistribution
towards the poor. But the argument is perfectly general, and can
be applied to many other forms of governmental redistribution.
The key facts about these programs are that they are chosen
through democratic political processes, financed through tax
dollars, and administered through civil service bureaucracies.
Finally, my discussion will be somewhat different from the
usual conservative critiques of the welfare state. In particular, I
shall not focus on the harm done to the intended recipients of
these transfer programs. Rather, I shall focus on the problems
created for people on the periphery of these programs, as well as
for the donors. Or perhaps I should say, the so-called donors.
I begin by making the most altruistic assumption about the
motives of those in the political process. Let us suppose that vot-
* Associate Professor of Economics, George Mason University. The
original talk upon which this article is based was published in the Fall 1996
BuLLETIN OF THE ASSOCIATION OF CHISTAN ECONOMISTS. The Heartland
Institute published an abridged version of the talk, as Heartland Policy Study
No. 71, February 1996. I received helpful comments from Mark Broski, O.S.B.,
Greg Gronbacher, and P.J. Hill.
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ers and other political decision-makers are motivated by a genu-
ine desire to help those who are in distress through no fault of
their own. Such people would include those unable to work, and
who were also unable to accumulate assets on which to live dur-
ing periods without work. The elderly poor, the disabled, the
temporarily unemployed and children without families might fall
into this category.
I assume away any demand for social assistance that might
arise for selfish motives. Ignore the possibility that people who
expect to administer the programs form a political constituency
for the creation and continued existence of the programs.
Assume that voters do not conceptualize the system as an exten-
sion of private insurance programs. That is, people do not offer
their political support for these programs because they have cal-
culated that there is some probability that they will one day be in
need of the program, and that at the implicit tax price, such a
program offers them a good insurance deal.1 Finally, assume
that people do not support the programs because they are afraid
of civil unrest that might be created by the indigent.
In effect, then, I shall assume away the whole range of sordid
and semi-sordid motives that are the stock-in-trade of public
choice analysis, and for which we economists have acquired the
reputation of being unduly cynical. The voters, the politicians,
the administrators, all support social assistance programs because
they feel compassion for the unfortunate, and are genuinely will-
ing to spend their own resources to assist them. The thrust of my
argument shall be that even with the best of motives, there is
something about the modern social assistance state' that will cor-
rupt these good motives, and these good people.
1. Public finance economists have long analyzed social security as social
insurance, both from an economic and political point of view. The classic
economic reference is Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,
36 REv. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). A standard political analysis of social
security as an insurance program can be found in Edgar K. Browning, Why the
Social Insurance Budget is Too Large in a Democracy, 13 EcoN. INQURY 373 (1975).
John Rawls implicitly treats an equal distribution of income as the result of a
variety of insurance calculation, in his A THEORY or JUSTICE (1971).
2. To my knowledge, the term social assistance state originated with Pope
John Paul II in CENTEMUS ANmus (1991). Readers of that document will
recognize the influence of the Holy Father's teaching in my critique of the
modem state's activities.
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I. HARMS TO POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS:
MORAL HAZARD, RENT-SEEKING AND
THE TRGEtD' OF THE COMMONS
We begin by assuming that the transfer program has some
well-defined criteria for eligibility. We assume this because the
program is to be administered bureaucratically, not personally.
The administrators of the program must be limited in the
amount of discretion they can use in distributing the transfers.
Indeed, the whole point of a civil service bureaucracy is to
limit the amount of discretion that government employees have.
This limit serves two purposes. It protects the employees from
political pressure that would necessarily hound them if they pos-
sessed significant discretion. And it protects the public from
abuse by either unscrupulous or politicized bureaucrats.3 The
legislature creates bureaucracies, and requires them to follow
specified procedures ensuring the mission of the institution is
carried out. The primary accountability of the bureaucracy is to
these procedures. Of course, formally, the bureaucracy is
accountable to the institution that created it. But in practice,
this usually means that they are held accountable to a set of pro-
cedures, forms and guidelines.4 For all these reasons, we can
safely assume that the income transfer program we are consider-
ing has specific eligibility requirements, with a minimum of dis-
cretion in its administration.
It is easy to see that this would not necessarily be true of non-
governmental transfer programs. We can readily imagine an
appeal for funds being made for the support of a specific family
in particular distress. We can readily imagine the administrators
of private charities scrutinizing the recipients on a variety of sub-
jective, unmeasurable criteria. But what is acceptable, or even
desirable for a local privately funded charitable organization,
would be out of the question for a tax-supported, governmentally
3. Joseph D. Reid, Jr. & Michael M. Kurth, The Rise and Fall of Urban
Political Patronage Machines, in STRATEGIC FACTORs IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY. A VOLUME TO HONOR ROBERT W. FOGEL 427,
432-34, 445 (Claudia Goldin & Hugh Rockoff eds., 1992) argue that civil service
bureaucracies were less directly accountable to particular voters than patronage
machines. See also Gary Libecap & Ronald Johnson, Patronage to Merit and
Control of the Federal Government Labor Force, 31 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 91,
93-98 (1994).
4. The economic theory of bureaucracy is an underdeveloped field. The
field has scarcely advanced since the classic works by WILLIAM NISKANEN,
BURE-AUCRACy AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) and GORDON TULLOCK,
TmE PoLrTcs OF BUREAUCRACY (1965). Most empirical work in the study of
bureaucracy utilizes these works, either implicitly or explicitly.
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administered transfer program. People can withhold their con-
tributions from private charities that exercise discretion in ways
they find distasteful. The need for continual appeal for funds
provides a check on the use and abuse of discretion that is simply
absent from a tax-supported program.
The governmentally operated program must have well-
defined eligibility criteria, benefit formulae and the like. The
program must be administered by a bureaucracy with a mini-
mum of discretion in the application of these rules. However, it
is not possible to create a set of rules that will fully cover every
case.5 Some discretion is necessary in practice. So let us con-
sider the most common case at the margin.
We know that when people have insurance, they often take
less care to avoid the event insured against. In extreme cases,
they may even create the event that would make themselves eligi-
ble for the insurance payout. This phenomenon is known as
moral hazard.6 Moral hazard is, of course, a significant problem
in income support programs. For a person can make himself eli-
gible for the insurance benefit by reducing his work effort. Since
the transfer program in question is not supposed to be an insur-
ance program from the point of view of the voters, we might won-
der whether it is fully legitimate to refer to this as moral hazard.
If this troubles us, we might call it by another name: rent-seeking.
Economists define "rent" as an economic return in excess of
the normal market rate. Economists use the term "rent-seeking"
to refer to the expenditure of time, effort and money that people
make to qualify themselves for these higher than ordinary
returns on investment. In ordinary economic markets, excess
returns are usually bid down to normal market levels through the
competitive process, and through new participants entering the
market. But when rents are created through the political pro-
cess, they can be stable. The excess returns can persist over a
5. See, e.g.,Oliver Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233 (1979). An accessible discussion of
the economics of contracts can be found in ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS (1988).
6. The economic analysis of moral hazard in insurance markets is the
subject of a vast literature. See, e.g., Ariel Rubinstein & Menahem G. Yaari,
Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, 30 J. ECON. THEORY 74 (1983),
and RA. Lambert, Long term contracts and Moral Hazard, 14 Bin. J. ECON. 441
(1983). For an advanced textbook treatment of moral hazard, see DAVID M.
KREps, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1990), especially chapters 16 and
17.
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long period of time, even if large numbers of people are
attracted to the activity or market paying the excess return.7
The transfer payment, or welfare payment, is a higher than
normal return, created through political means. And, the exist-
ence of these rents creates an incentive for rent-seeking. The
potential recipient expends some resources, perhaps simply in
the form of forgoing earning power, in order to qualify for the
transfer.
Let us assume that this person makes himself eligible for the
transfer, so that there is no question of explicit fraud. Nonethe-
less, this person does not meet the implicit eligibility criteria,
namely, being without funds through no fault of his own. The
existence of the transfer has tempted him, yes, let us use the the-
ological term, tempted him, to commit an act that is both deceit-
ful and slothful.
When this person presents himself to the welfare system, the
person he encounters may know perfectly well that he does not
meet the implicit contractual standard of the program. But,
because the person meets the explicit, readily measurable eligi-
bility criteria, the bureaucrat has little choice but to approve the
transfer. The person is added to the welfare rolls, even though
he knows, and the bureaucrat knows, that he is in violation of the
plain intention of the program's founders and funders. But
nothing really can be done about it.
The social worker might feel quite confident that an appli-
cant for aid is a shirker, but she could not prove it. She might
not be able to quantify or even articulate her reasons. In a
bureaucratically administered program, all of the tacit informa-
tion about whether a person is simply shirking, or really in need,
is lost.
Friedrich A. Hayek's fundamental critique of centrally
planned economies was that such a system squanders a vast
amount of implicit, personal, local information about scarcity,
production and preferences.' Something comparable takes
place in bureaucratically administered social assistance pro-
grams. All the tacit knowledge about a person's specific situation
and character is lost to the system.
7. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5
W. EcON. J. 224 (1967); Anne Kreuger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 291 (1974). For a survey of recent work on rent-
seeking, see Robert Tollison, Rent-Seeking- A Survey, 35 Kviu.os 575 (1982).
8. FA. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REV. 519
(1945); and 1 FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973).
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We could allow the bureaucrats to exercise some discretion,
but we can immediately see that this opens them to equally grave
temptations for abuse of the public trust. For even a marginally
unscrupulous social worker would be tempted to make capri-
cious decisions in the allocation of tax dollars that have been
entrusted to her for a specific purpose. Indeed, I have no doubt
that there is some element of caprice in the administration of
existing programs, even with all of their rules, guidelines, and
formulae.
So, we are caught in a dilemma. If we give the social worker
the authority to use enough discretion to eliminate moral haz-
ard, we create a temptation for the social worker. If we eliminate
all discretion on the part of the social worker, we create a tempta-
tion for shirking and deception on the part of potential
recipients.
The dilemma arises because of the way the modern state
must structure its transfer activity. The program is funded by tax
dollars. Therefore, no matter how the money is allocated, it
remains "other people's money," a common pool resource from
the viewpoint of the persons allocating it.
A "common pool resource" is one which belongs to a group.
The "Tragedy of the Commons" is a particular problem for com-
mon pool resources. Everyone in the group has a right to use
the resource freely, with little or no accountability to the rest of
the group. The universal example of a common pool resource is
common grazing lands. Everyone in the community is entitled to
graze on that land. Everyone has a tendency to view his own use
of the land as his primary interest, and the long-term health of
the land as somebody else's problem. No one in the community
has a personal stake in the long-term good of the land. The trag-
edy arises because the land is systematically over-grazed, some-
times to the point of destruction. The situation is doubly tragic,
because the destruction of the resource could have been avoided
by a different set of rules regarding the ownership and use of the
land.
Similarly, tax-funded charity programs have a common pool
resource quality to them, and so are susceptible to the tragedy of
the commons. The person who spends the money is not the per-
son who earned it, or who raised it. The money flows to the wel-
fare bureaucracy, independently of the actions of any particular
social worker. Even a large amount of discretion poorly used
would probably not cut the flow of funds to any particular social
worker. The social workers do not have, and cannot have, a per-
sonal stake in how the money is spent. The programs are
bureaucratically administered, by people who are accountable
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neither to the recipients of the transfers nor to the donors. The
agency is accountable only to the procedures that have been cre-
ated for it by the legislature. The personal aspects of the trans-
fers have all been stripped away by the political process
surrounding them.
Consider an alternative arrangement for organizing charity.
Suppose we want to give money to an unfortunate person. We
see the person to whom we are giving. We make the judgement.
We decide whether to give or not give, whether to scold or not
scold, whether to offer material help such as a room in our
home, or whether to simply give money and be on our way. At
the same time, the person asking for help sees us. He makes the
judgment whether it is worth his while to ask, whether he is will-
ing to put up with a lecture, whether he wants to be personally
indebted to another person, whether he can defend his status as
truly unfortunate. This kind of encounter is personal. It has the
potential to capture all of the implicit, tacit knowledge that the
bureaucratically administered system cannot.'
Even if we do not make the transfer directly, and personally,
we might, in effect, hire an agent. We donate our money to per-
sons and organizations whose missions and methods we approve.
We trust them to monitor the moral hazard problem for us. We
trust them to offer the other non-monetary forms of assistance
that might be needed. If we believe they have failed in their mis-
sion, we withdraw our support. There is but a single agent
between us and our recipients. And there is almost no common
pool problem, either on the funding side, or on the monitoring
side. This short chain of personal relationships cuts the tempta-
tion for shirking on the side of the recipient, and for capricious-
ness on the side of the administrator.
II. LEGISLATING MORALITY
Now, some might object that the distinction between the
deserving and undeserving poor is an archaic and inhumane
one. The social assistance state was established precisely to elimi-
nate the judgements made by private charities. The social assist-
ance state creates a systematic method for dealing with the
problem of poverty. The whole point of the welfare state was to
establish a routine that applies to all cases in which people lack
material resources, regardless of the reason. The creation of an
entitlement, which does not have to be justified on a case-by-case
9. The argument by Reid & Kurth, supra note 3, is, in effect, that
patronage workers in political machines provided many relief services in this
direct way that allowed them to monitor the behavior of the recipients.
1997]
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basis is defended as being a more efficient method of dealing
with poverty.
Now if poverty were an exogenous event, something that
simply happened to a person, the case for a systematic, routine,
no-questions-asked approach would be much stronger. But the
fact is, that although some poverty has this exogenous quality,
there remains a large realm in which personal choices are the
predominant factor leading to poverty. Single mothers and their
children are the largest category of people living in poverty.
Many people in poverty have drug and alcohol dependencies.
Single motherhood is not a random event. Drug addiction does
not 'just happen" to someone. And where choice is involved, we
have to face the fact that some choices are objectively better than
others. And this leads us into morality.
Morality presents an additional problem for the social assist-
ance state. Actually, it is a variant of the earlier problem of how
much discretion to give the administrators. For if we insist that
the program pay attention to the lifestyle choices of welfare
recipients, either we have to legislate the moral code we want
into the program, or we have to grant the administrator discre-
tion in applying more general rules.
We can readily see the dangers of a moral code created by
the political process. The politically determined choices
required of welfare recipients could range from "You must get
married to the father of this child," to "You must abort this
child," and anything in between.
Indeed, we know from voting theory that decisions made by
majority rule often have some undesirable properties. It is quite
often the case that no one policy can beat every other policy in
pairwise, competition voting. For instance, policy A might beat
policy B, while policy B might beat policy C. But instead of A
beating C as one might expect, policy C can actually beat policy
A. When this happens, the results of the election will be arbi-
trary, because the outcome will depend on procedural rules
rather than on the preferences of the people. The results can be
incoherent, because mutually contradictory policies can emerge
from a logroll. And the policy outcomes can be unstable, as the
voters rotate through the set of possible majority coalitions."
10. The references on this point are legion. The vote cycle was evidently
first discovered in the eighteenth century by the Marquis de Condorcet. The
first modern expositions of the problem were DUNCAN BLAcx, TiH THEORY OF
CoMMIrrxEs AND ELECTIONS (1958) and KENNETH ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). When the problem emerged in the modem
literature, the reaction of both the economics and political science professions
was to attempt to prove the proposition false. However, the voluminous
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Those who would like the state to enforce a moral code
deceive themselves if they believe they will be able to control the
content of that code. Traditionalists view the state as being hope-
lessly controlled by the well-entrenched liberal establishment,
with any victories being hard-won exceptions or aberrations. At
the same time, progressives view those very same victories as evi-
dence of a well-funded juggernaut of the Religious Right. What
the traditionalists see as the steady wearing down of traditional
morality, with all trends pushing in the same direction, the
progressives view as incremental and hard-fought gains against a
formidable foe. There is an element of truth to both of these
apparently conflicting perceptions. The reason for the divergent
perceptions is that the political system can not produce stable
outcomes, at least not at the level of detail required by some of its
programs. No one, not even any one coalition, can control the
modern democratic state for long.
In spite of this inherent instability, we can make some pre-
dictions about the general direction of the cycling process. Sup-
pose we began from a position in which the vast majority of
people agreed to a substantive moral code. It would not be too
far-fetched, for instance, to assert that most people in America in
1787 agreed to the moral code embodied in the Ten Command-
ments. We can readily predict what would happen if we allowed
people to vote on a moral code. The competitive process would
begin to unravel the sanctions surrounding violations of the
moral law.
literature seems to show that the problem is real, and pervasive. Richard
McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications
forAgenda Control 12J. ECON. THEoRY 472 (1976) is the standard reference.
For experimental demonstration of sensitivity of voting outcomes to
various details of institutional design, see Morris P. Fiorina & Charles R. Plott,
Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study, 72 AM. POL. Sci.
REV. 575 (1978). In this study, students were induced to have preferences over
the positions of dots on the blackboard. Charles R Plott & Michael E. Levine, A
Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 146 (1978) is
an experimental study of an airplane club's decisions about which planes to
purchase. The chairman of the meeting used agenda control to induce the
club to vote for his most preferred alternative.
For those who would like to convince themselves that the instability alluded to
in the text is real, I offer the following standard example. Suppose there are
three voters, X, Y and Z, and three possible policies A, B and C, among which
they must choose. Suppose further that voter X ranks the policies from most
preferred to least preferred as follows: A, B, C. Voter Y ranks the policies: B, C,
A. Finally, voter Z ranks the policies: C, A, B. None of the three policies can
beat each of the other two if they are voted upon in pairs. In this situation, the
voters can rotate among the policies with no clear resolution.
1997]
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For even people who know right from wrong sometimes do
wrong. And when they do wrong, most people find it much eas-
ier to be absolved at minimal cost, than to admit fully that they
were wrong and do appropriate penance. Even people who
believe an act is wrong will have a tendency to vote for the politi-
cians who give them the most minimal penalties. And sooner or
later, some politician will seize upon the arguments that claim
the act wasn't really wrong in the first place. People with a bad
conscience find it convenient to believe that their actions were
not really wrong.1 The competitive process will have a tendency
to drive the moral code toward the most minimal possible.12
So, a reasonable system of distributing relief to the poor
requires some attention to the choices made by the recipients of
relief. Once we begin to pay attention to the choices made by
recipients, we will need to offer some justifications for the policy
decisions about which choices to endorse and which behaviors to
forbid. And we are then inevitably drawn into questions of eth-
ics. But the democratic process is not suitable for either discover-
ing morality or choosing among competing moralities. How,
then, shall we approach the problem of poor relief?
One approach to this problem is to insist upon the separa-
tion of the state from the entire endeavor of transferring income
among citizens. In defense of this approach we might argue that
political rulers do not have the right to embrace every aspect of
human existence under their authority. Not all of the social
order properly proceeds from politics. The family, for instance,
is a social institution that arises naturally without the assistance of
the state, and has needs that exist independently of any political
or legal order. Likewise, we might argue, the provision of poor
relief is an activity that properly belongs to the sphere of society
not governed by the political process, and not dominated by
government.
This position has a long and respectable Catholic pedigree.
For over a millennium, the Church in the west has insisted both
upon the freedom to operate within its proper realm, and that
the proper scope of the state is limited. Indeed, some scholars
attribute the free political institutions of the west to the Church's
11. For an argument showing the appeal of moral relativism for good
people with guilty consciences, seeJennifer Roback Morse, Moral Agnosticism as a
Human Rights Problem: the Problem of Self-Deception, in NErrHER VICTIM NOR ENEMY.
WOMEN'S FREEDOM NETWORK LOOKS AT GENDER IN AMERICA (Rita J. Simon ed.,
1995).
12. This is perhaps what Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) meant
when he described America as having "Defined Deviancy Down."
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jealous defense of her prerogatives within her sphere.1 3 The
Church insisted on full authority to select bishops and abbots,
sometimes at great risk to herself. The Church insisted on full
authority to discipline the clergy. And finally, the Church
insisted that her rules regarding marriage stood as valid, inde-
pendently of civil laws.14 To argue that charity should be dis-
pensed by religious institutions, and that such institutions have
the authority to regulate the conduct of recipients of their aid, is
consistent with a long line of Catholic thinking.
And so, there are some powerful reasons why the agents of
the state should be required to remain morally neutral in the
distribution of tax dollars to the indigent. The state is not com-
petent to create morality, or even to discover what it is. In other
words, the state is not really competent to do the one thing that
desperately needs to be done if the problem of poverty is to be
addressed. Namely, the state cannot supervise the personal
choices of thousands of people that qualify or might qualify for
income support.
III. THE ENTITLEMENT MENTALrTY AND
THE PmsoNEV.s' DiLEMMA
There is one further problem to the creation of an entitle-
ment that depends only on a few, readily measurable criteria.
We might call this problem, "the entitlement mentality." That is,
people come to take seriously the claim that all that matters is
whether they meet the legally stated, explicit criteria of the pro-
gram. If they are entitled to the benefit, why not claim it?
Indeed, as more and more people take part in the program, the
person on the margin of participating might argue to himself:
"Everyone else is doing it. If I do not take the opportunity to use
this program, I will feel like a sucker."
This phenomenon has been captured in a parable known as
the Prisoners' Dilemma. Many social scientists and philosophers
use this parable as a model for problematic cooperation. The
Prisoners' Dilemma analyzes situations in which it is collectively
beneficial for people to cooperate with each other, even while it
is in their individual and private interest to be uncooperative.
The Prisoners' Dilemma takes its name from the following
situation. Two people have jointly committed a crime and have
13. See HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADrnON (1983).
14. PHILIP HUGHES, A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH: THE CHURCH AND THE
WORLD THE CHURCH CREATED 209-39 (1935). See also BERMAN, supra note 13, at
85-107, 255-64.
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both been arrested. The authorities do not have sufficient evi-
dence to convict either prisoner. So they offer the following deal
to each prisoner separately.
If neither you nor your accomplice confess, you will both go
free, for we have insufficient evidence to convict you. If you con-
fess, however, your accomplice will receive the full sentence, but
we will give you a reduced sentence. If he confesses and you do
not, you will receive the full sentence, while he gets the lighter
sentence. And when a prisoner poses the question, "what if we
both confess?" the reply is, "you both get the full sentence
allowed by law, for we will have all the evidence we could possibly
need."
Both prisoners will confess under this scenario, as long as
there are no possibilities for them communicating with each
other, or offering each other bribes or side payments. This is a
dilemma for the prisoners, because both would be better off if
neither confesses. But since neither can be sure the other will
cooperate with him, neither is willing to take the chance of being
the only one to remain silent. They would be better off if they
could cooperate with each other. But the prison guards do
everything possible to prevent cooperation, both by preventing
communication and by the structure of the deal they offer the
prisoners. So both prisoners confess and receive the heaviest
sentence.
Many social interactions have a structure of payoffs similar to
that described by the Prisoners' Dilemma. I would be better off
if no one littered in the park. But I cannot stop others from
littering. So why pay the cost of cleaning up after myself, if no
one else has done so, or is likely to do so? I would be better off if
no one ever made a frivolous liability lawsuit. But since I am
already bearing the social cost of many such frivolous lawsuits,
why shouldn't I "dial for dollars" with a liability suit of my own if
a plausible occasion presents itself to me?
In the entitlement mentality, the Prisoners' Dilemma prob-
lem emerges dramatically. Why should I restrain myself from
opportunistic behavior, when I know that other people are not
restraining themselves? The momentum of the decision can
build to such a point that people stop resisting the temptation to
take advantage of the program. Instead, they resist being stuck
with the "sucker's payoff."
This point is especially evident as we generalize the analysis
from poverty programs and toward the middle class entitlements.
We believe ourselves to be entitled to Social Security, student
loans, mortgage interest tax deductions, NSF Grants, and all the
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rest. After all, we have paid for these benefits already, haven't
we? Everybody else is getting his share, why should we restrain
ourselves? The aversion to being a sucker crosses economic class
lines, and is familiar to everyone. And so, we have the spectacle
of Ross Perot receiving Social Security payments, with no hint of
scandal.
We know that rents induce rent-seeking. We know that the
Prisoners' Dilemma will induce people to behave in opportunis-
tic ways. But let us, for a moment, not hide behind this technical
language, this sterile terminology from scientific economic analy-
sis. Let us call the behavior sinful. People do through the public
sector things they would know to be wrong if done in the private
sector to people they knew. People take advantage of the system,
knowing full well that if everyone did what they are doing, the
system would collapse.
This is the sense in which the redistributive activities of the
modern state may be called an occasion of sin. There is nothing
intrinsically wrong with transfers of money to the unfortunate, or
indeed to anyone for a great many reasons. But the existence of
the taxing power of the state to collect monies means that the
entire wealth of the nation, or at least a significant fraction of it,
becomes a common pool resource for the distribution through
the political process. And this pool creates temptations for mar-
ginally unscrupulous behavior. And this marginally unscrupu-
lous behavior can only escalate as the process progresses, as
people come to justify their actions, both to themselves and to
others.
IV. HARMS TO THE SO-CALLED DONORS
When the Catholic novelist Flannery O'Connor was once
asked how one might come to know God, her response was,
"Give alms." Of course, this is quite a different response from,
"Fill out your tax forms," or "vote for the candidate who sounds
compassionate." To consider the impact of the social assistance
state on the donors, or net taxpayers, we must begin by discuss-
ing the benefits one receives from the act of giving. We must
then consider whether those benefits really are obtained by the
taxpayers in a bureaucratic welfare state. Only then, will we be in
a position to evaluate the opportunity cost, broadly defined, of
the social assistance state.
Perhaps the simplest way to understand O'Connor's remark
is to consider these famous words attributed to Jesus: "Truly I say
to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you
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did it to me."1 5 In this passage, Our Lord does more than
instruct us to practice the corporal works of mercy. For He
promises to be present in the transaction, as the recipient. In
this way, we might see the face of God in the face of the poor.
This is at the heart of the Christian perspective on giving.
The donor has the experience of participating, in some small
way, in the endless mercy of God, from whom our very existence
is a gift we can never repay or hope to deserve. The immediate
recipient is only part of the point of the transaction. An equally
important point is the impact of the act of unrequited generosity
on the donor.
One of the more interesting contrasts between economic
thinking and theological thinking has to do with their respective
views of the human person. Economists tend to see the person as
static. This is true especially of the person's interior life. Econo-
mists act as if the person's preferences, desires and goals are
unchanging. The problem for the person is to satisfy these static
desires at least cost.
Catholic moral theology pays particular attention to the
dynamics of the person's interior life. Some moral theologians
actually define a moral act (or an act with moral consequences)
as one that creates a disposition for future acts. If a person acts
in an immoral fashion, he will be more disposed to further simi-
lar immoral acts in the future. Similarly, if a person acts in a
morally good way, he will find it easier to perform those moral
acts in the future. An economist would say that there is a feed-
back loop from behavior to preferences. The person's prefer-
ences are changed by his actions. A person becomes a different
kind of person as a result of the decisions he makes and the
actions he performs.16
This view of the person is at the heart of Vatican II's call for
the renewal of moral theology. The Council Fathers called upon
moral theology to become more than conformity to a set of
rules. 7 Catholic moral teaching seemed to many people to have
deteriorated into two ever more detailed lists. On one list were
things that must be done. On the other list were things that must
not be done. Keep the two lists, with or without charity, with or
without good will, and one was assured of heaven. Vatican II's
15. Matthew 25:40.
16. GERMAIN GRISEZ & RussELL SHAw, FULFILLMENT IN CHRIST: A SuMMARY
OF CHISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 12-25 (1991).
17. This renewal is implied in many of the Council Documents. See Decree
on Priestly Formation, in DocuMENTs OF VATICAN H (Walter M. Abbott, S.J., ed. &
Joseph Gallagher trans., 1966). See also GRISEZ & SHAW, supra note 16, at 1-12.
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renewal of moral theology was supposed to make "Two List
Catholicism" a thing of the past.
Following the Lord Jesus is the key in Catholic moral theol-
ogy, both to living a moral life, and to everlasting life. The legal-
ism inherent in the "two lists" approach can sometimes divert
people from that truth. A legalistic mentality tends to suggest
that people can and should look for the minimum that they need
to do for salvation. People can, if they choose, avoid the radical
transformation required by the Gospel, by contenting themselves
with the bare minimums required by the lists. The rules are
intended to be the minimum, not the maximum; the starting
point for the unreserved giving of the self to the Lord.
Of course, some of the reaction to Vatican II has been to act
as if there are no rules, to move from "Two List Catholicism" to
"No List Catholicism," or "Cafeteria Catholicism." But there can
be little doubt that the Council Fathers hoped for a genuine
renewal. The Catechism makes this point very clearly."8
So, what is the impact of the act of giving upon the donor?
This, of course, depends at least as much on how the gift is made
as upon the amount of the gift. The admonition to "give to the
least of my brethren" appears to be independent of how the gift
is given. But surely the promise of Matthew 25 flows more
directly and more powerfully the more personal the encounter
between donor and recipient.
As we look at the person we are giving to, no matter how
unworthy he may seem, we are invited to see the face of God.
This equation of God with the lowly is a part of the Divine
Humility that is so much a part of the Gospel. But at the same
time, His humility humbles us as well. For it reminds us that we
really do not know what is going on with that other person. He
may appear for all the world to be nothing but a bum. But some-
how, when we give to this person, we are giving to God Himself.
We are not supposed to worry about being a sucker. We are sup-
posed to give, as God gives to us. And in the process, we soften
ourselves, as we open our hearts to others. We allow ourselves to
be changed.19
18. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH paras. 1691-98 (1994).
19. Of course, the exchange might have a permanent, positive impact on
the recipient as well. One famous fictional account of such a change is the story
of Jean Vajean, as told in Les Miserables. The escaped convict, Jean Vajean
steals silver plate from the bishop who has offered him shelter for the night.
Upon his arrest, Valjean claims the bishop gave it to him. When the constable
takes him to the bishop with this lie, the bishop covers for him, and says that he
forgot to take the candlesticks he meant for him to have. And the bishop
whispers to Vajean, "use these things to live an honest life." The entire rest of
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Does our participation in the welfare state effect this kind of
transformation in those of us who are net payers? Are our hearts
softened toward the poor by our contributions to the welfare
state? Who can deny that the exact opposite is the case? We
avoid seeing the reality of the persons who receive the benefits.
And when we do see them, we feel a kind of bitterness toward
them. After all, we have already done our share, and that, largely
against our will. Who is this person, accosting me on the subway,
or on the street? We have hardened our hearts against them.
Vatican II's call for the renewal of moral theology occurred
at roughly the same time as the establishment of the Great Soci-
ety programs in America. Are the two compatible? Superficially,
it might seem so, because the Great Society appears to be an
increased social commitment to the care of the poor. But at a
deeper level, the Great Society substitutes a legalistic, minimalist
approach to the Christian precept of charity. For what could be
a more minimalistic contribution to the poor than pulling the
voting lever for a candidate whose speechwriter sounds compas-
sionate? What could be more legalistic than filling out a tax
return, and believing we have satisfied the biblical injunction to
charity?
So now, we might want to look more closely at our opening
assumption about the motives of the taxpayer/donors. We
assumed that people voluntarily assumed the tax burden of sup-
porting the poor because they were genuinely concerned for
them. But, by choosing an indirect method of helping them, we
cut ourselves off from the spiritual benefits of almsgiving. Per-
haps this is what we, as voters, wanted.
We want the poor to be taken care of, without inconvenienc-
ing ourselves. We want to believe that we satisfy the biblical
requirements of charity, without ever leaving the comfort of our
living rooms. We do not want to see the face of the poor. We
resist being transformed.
V. MATERIAL INCENTIVE AND SPIRITUAL INCENTIVES
In this somewhat roundabout way, we can perhaps see a way
out of our public choice dilemma. Public choice problems arise
when the private, individual incentives are not in harmony with
the public interest. Let us consider the spiritual incentives.
Why does Mother Theresa give to the poor? We might say
that she has a private motive, or that she receives a personal ben-
the story is about how Valjean lived up to this admonition from the bishop; how
his life was completely transformed by this act of kindness.
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efit from providing this public service. She is doing it for the
love of God and to save her own soul. But her private, spiritual
incentives lead to doing a public service, rather than to lining
her own pocket at public expense.
And so as we consider the question of whether non-govern-
mental charity is really a practical option, we might keep this in
mind. There is, in the spiritual incentives, less moral hazard, less
conflict of public and private interests, than there is in any gov-
ernmental program we could devise. And so we might become
more appreciative of the Little Sisters of the Poor, the Teaching
Sisters of Notre Dame, the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de
Paul, the Benedictines, the Franciscans, and all the rest. Far
from being impractical dreamers, these are the most practical
people around. They have a better chance of providing for
others without corrupting themselves. Their personal interest in
saving their own souls through a lifetime of charity gives them a
better chance of being of genuine service to others, than any
employee of Health and Human Services will ever have.
VI. CONCLUSION: CONFESSION
My readers might wonder at this point, how I can speak
about such matters with any authority. And particularly, those of
you who know me, know full well that I am not any kind of a
saint. Some of you may be wondering, "Has Jenny flipped?" So
let me close by telling you what happened to me.
I have had the opportunity to participate in an ongoing, per-
sonal act of charity. Mind you, I did not intend to do any such
thing. As a matter of fact, I entered into it with not very good
motives. I was a barren yuppie, fast approaching middle age, and
desperate for motherhood.
And so my husband and I adopted a two and a half year old
Romanian boy from an orphanage. He was described as healthy,
but truly, the adoption agency had to admit they did not know
anything about him besides his name and his birth date. And so
we plunged in.
If we had known what we were getting into, we would have
been afraid to try it. For as it turned out, he was developmentally
delayed and emotionally disturbed. But there was no turning
back. And I can honestly say, that in spite of all the difficulties he
causes, that our son and the experience of parenting him, has
changed us for the better.
It occurred to me, very early in parenting him, that there
really was no social program that could be any substitute for what
we were doing for him. Children have to be raised one at a time.
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There are no shortcuts that can be mass-produced by the state.
He went from being a statistic, and a social problem, to being our
son.
And it also became clear to me, that being a mother was the
most important thing I would ever do. I once had great fantasies
of doing important work, of changing the world through my own
brilliance. But Our Lord had other plans for me.
I found out, much against my own wishes, that I had to aban-
don that perspective of myself as the center of the universe. It is
true that I am at the center of my children's universe. But messy
pants and temper tantrums are not the sort of glory and fame I
had envisioned for myself.
And as I continued this process of doing whatever was neces-
sary, even what would have seemed impossible, another quota-
tion came to mind. "Sell all your possessions, and come follow
me." Oh. He is talking to me. I did not mean to follow Christ in
the radical way that He demanded of the rich young man. I did
not think that message was meant for me. But this message has
been for me all along. Why wasn't I listening earlier? I didn't
mean to let this religion thing get out of hand like this. But He
seduced me. And I have been the unwitting and reluctant bene-
ficiary of His grace.
This is why I have come to believe that bureaucratized social
programs are no substitute for the giving from one person to
another that is the true meaning of caritas. And the modem state
which leads us to believe that there are shortcuts, that we can
have the results of charity without the personal reality of charity,
this modem state deceives us. Or perhaps I should say, we use
the instruments of the modem state to deceive ourselves on
these vital matters. For these reasons among others, I believe it is
fair to describe the modem state as an occasion of sin.
